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a b s t r a c t
We study the online version of the scheduling problem Q ‖ Cmax involving selfish
agents, considered by Archer and Tardos in [A. Archer, E. Tardos, Truthful mechanisms
for one-parameter agents, in: Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of
Computer Science (FOCS), 2001, pp. 482–491], where jobs must be scheduled onm related
machines, each of them owned by a different selfish agent.
We present a general technique for transforming competitive online algorithms for
Q ‖ Cmax into truthful online mechanisms with a small loss of competitiveness.
We also investigate the issue of designing new online algorithms from scratch so as
to obtain efficient competitive mechanisms, and prove some lower bounds on a class
of ‘‘natural’’ algorithms. A ‘‘direct’’ use of such natural algorithms to construct truthful
mechanisms yields only trivial upper bounds for the case of two machines.
Finally, we consider mechanisms with verification, introduced by Nisan and Ronen
[N. Nisan, A. Ronen, Algorithmic mechanism design, in: Proceedings of the 31st Annual
ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC, 1999, pp. 129–140], for offline scheduling
problems. We present the first constant-competitive online truthful mechanism with
verification for any number of machines.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Optimization problems dealing with resource allocation are classical algorithmic problems and they have been studied
for decades in severalmodels. Typically, algorithms are evaluated by comparing the (measure of) the solutions they return to
the best possible one. In particular, one tries to estimate the loss of performance due to the lack of computational resources
(approximation ratio) or to the lack of information (competitive ratio).
In both settings, the underlying hypothesis is that the input is (eventually) available to the algorithm, either from the
beginning in offline algorithms or during its execution in online algorithms. This assumption cannot be considered realistic in
the context ofmodernnetworks like the Internetwhere certain information regarding the resources are not directly available
to the ‘‘protocol’’. Indeed, the resources are owned/controlled/used by different self-interested entities (e.g., corporations,
autonomous systems, etc.). Each of these entities, or selfish agents, hold some private information which is needed to the
protocol in order to compute an optimal resource allocation (e.g., routing the traffic over the Internet requires routers of
different autonomous systems to exchange information on which routers can process traffic faster). Each agent can possibly
misreport his/her piece of information if this leads the system to compute a solution that is more beneficial for her. Thus, in
spite of the fact that such a solution may not be globally optimal.
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Let us consider the following basic routing/scheduling problem (first introduced by Nisan and Ronen [14]). We want to
route one packet of size w over one of m parallel links with different speeds: link i takes w/si units of time to process this
packet and the value of si is known to agent i only (this is the speed of his/her link). Why should agent i report si, instead of
a different value ri? Given that 1/si represents the cost for agent i of processing a packet of unit size, reporting a ‘‘very high’’
value ri could let the algorithm to select some other link to route the packet. In this way agent iwould have a benefit, since
he/she will have no cost, but the resource allocation produced by the algorithm could be suboptimal.
The field ofMechanism Design is the branch of Game Theory andMicroeconomics that studies how to designmechanisms,
which guarantee that no agent has an incentive inmisreporting his/her piece of information. Loosely speaking, amechanism
is a pairM = (A, P), where A is an algorithm computing a solution, and P = (P1, . . . , Pn) is the vector of payment functions
(see Section 1.1 for a formal definition) given to the agents. Selfish agents are supposed to be rational and thus will deviate
from the truth-telling strategy (in the previous case, to report ri = si) only if a better one exists. Therefore, one seeks for
truthful mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that guarantee that every agent i can maximize his/her net profit or utility by
playing the truth-telling strategy.
1.1. The problem
Offline selfish scheduling. Consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines (Q||Cmax): We are given a set of m
machines with speed s1, s2, . . . , sm and a set of n jobs of size J1, J2, . . . , Jn. We want to assign every job to a machine so
as to minimize the makespan, that is, the maximum over all machines of wi/si, where wi is the sum of the job weights
assigned to machine i. The version of the problem where the number m of the machines is fixed is commonly denoted as
Qm||Cmax.
We study the selfish version of the Q||Cmax problem considered by Archer and Tardos [2]. In this model each machine
i is owned by a selfish agent and the corresponding speed si is known to that agent only. We call ti
def= 1/si the type of
agent i. Agent i reports to the algorithm a value bi, not necessarily equal to ti, and the algorithm computes a schedule S that
minimizes the makespan with respect to the values reported by the agents.
Each agent i is rational and she has her own valuation vi(X) for each possible schedule X . Intuitively, vi(X) represents
how much user i likes schedule X . More specifically, a schedule X that assigns a total amount of work wi to machine i is
valuated by agent i of type ti as vi(X), where
vi(X)
def= −wi · ti,
that is, the opposite of the completion time of machine i.
We remark that agent i selects the value bi to be reported to the algorithm in such a way to make the algorithm output
a schedule that he/she likes more.
We stress that our goal is to compute a solution Swhichminimizes themakespanwith respect to the truemachine speeds
s1, . . . , sm. Hence, we need to provide some incentive (e.g., a payment) to the each agent i in order to let her truthfully report
her speed.
Formally, a mechanism is a pair M = (A, P), where P = (P1, . . . , Pm), and A is a scheduling algorithm. Algorithm A gets
in input the list of jobs to process J and the types b = (b1, . . . , bm) reported by the agents, not necessarily equal to the true
types and computes a schedule A(b, J). Moreover, each agent i receives a payment equal to Pi(b, J). Obviously, each agent i
decides his/her strategy in such a way so as to maximize the resulting net profit or utility defined as
uMi (b, J)
def= Pi(b, J)+ vi(A(b, J)).
Each agent knows both algorithm A and the corresponding payment function Pi.
A mechanism is said to be truthful with dominant strategies (or simply truthful) if the payments P and the algorithm A
guarantee that no agent obtains a larger utility when reporting bi 6= ti, independently of the other agents’ reported types;
that is, for all J , for all reported types b−i
def= (b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bm) of all the agents except i, and for all possible
declarations bi of agent i, it holds that
uMi ((ti, b−i), J) ≥ uMi ((bi, b−i), J),
where the writing (x, b−i) denotes the vector (b1, . . . , bi−1, x, bi+1, . . . , bm). We stress that in this case no agent i has any
advantage from knowing the true speeds t−i of the other agents. Indeed, the utility of agent i does not depend on the speeds
of the other agents (i.e., the work and the payment assigned to agent i depend only on his own bid b). IfM guarantees that
the utility for all agents that report their true type is non-negative, then we say that the mechanism enjoys the voluntary
participation property.
Online selfish scheduling. In the online version of Q||Cmax, jobs arrive one-by-one and must be scheduled upon their arrival.
Moreover, jobs cannot be reallocated. For any (possibly infinite) sequence of jobs J = J1J2 · · ·, we let Jk denote the prefix
J1J2 · · · Jk of the first k jobs, for 1 ≤ k ≤ |J|. Before the first job appears, each agent declares her type and we denote by
b = (b1, . . . , bm) the vector of declared types. We remark that declared types cannot be changed during the processing of
the algorithm. An online mechanism for Q||Cmax is a pair M = (A, P) where A is an online algorithm for Q||Cmaxand P is a
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sequence of payment functions Pki , for i = 1, . . . ,m and k > 0 such that
– wAi (b, J
k) is the sum of the sizes of the jobs assigned to machine i by the solution computed by A on input Jk and the
vector b of declared types;
– Pki (b, J
k) is the non-negative payment assigned to agent i after the kth job is arrived and it has been assigned to amachine
by algorithm A.
Observe that the mechanism is not allowed to ask money back from the agents. The total payment received by agent i after
k jobs are processed is equal to Pi(b, Jk) =∑kj=1 P ji (b, J j).
The property of truthfulness is naturally extended to the online setting.
Definition 1 (Online Truthful Mechanism). We say that an online mechanism is truthful with respect to dominant strategies
if for any prefix Jk of the sequence of jobs J , for all b−i, and for all types ti, the function uMi ((bi, b−i), Jk) is maximized for
bi = ti.
Mechanisms with verification. We also study the online version of a different model of mechanisms, proposed by Nisan and
Ronen [14]. Here the payment for each job is awarded after the job is released by the machine (we stress that a machine
cannot release a job assigned to it before the job has been executed). Intuitively, if a machine has received positive work, the
mechanism can verify whether the machine lied declaring to be faster and, if so, the machine receives no payment. These
mechanisms are usually termed mechanisms with verification. Mechanisms that always provide an agent the associated
payment are sometimes called mechanisms without verification or simply mechanisms.
1.2. Previous results
Archer and Tardos [2] have characterized the (offline) algorithms A for theQ||Cmax problem forwhich there exist payment
functions P such that (A, P) is a truthful mechanism. In particular, they show that if an algorithm A is monotone (see
Definition 2) then there exist payment functions P such that (A, P) is truthful. Under mild assumptions on A, it is possible
to define the payment functions to guarantee also the voluntary participation property. They also gave a monotone optimal
(exponential-time) algorithm and a (3+ε)-approximation randomized (polynomial-time)monotone algorithm for Q||Cmax.
Andelman et al. [1] provided an elegant technique for turning any ρ-approximation algorithm for Qm||Cmax into a ρ(1+ ε)-
approximation monotone algorithm. As a result, given any polynomial-time (1 + ε)-approximation algorithm for this
problem, one can obtain a (1 + ε)-approximation truthful mechanism running in polynomial time. They indeed settle the
approximation guarantee of the Qm||Cmax by obtaining a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme which is monotone.
A 2.8-approximation truthful mechanism for any number of machines has been presented by Kovacs [12,13]. Recently,
Dhangwatnotai et al. [8] presented the first monotone randomized PTAS for Q||Cmax.
Nisan and Ronen [14] considered also the case of unrelatedmachines and gave a randomized 7/4-approximation truthful
mechanism for two machines and a deterministic m-approximation truthful mechanism for any number m of machines.
Moreover, they proved that, for any ε > 0, no deterministic truthful mechanism can be (2 − ε)-approximation for m ≥ 2
machines. Improvements to this bound can be found in [7,9]. The best current lower bound is due to Koutsoupias and Vidali
[11] and it is equal to 1+φ ≈ 2.618, where φ is the golden ratio. Christodoulou et al. [6] proposed a 1+ n−12 -approximation
monotone algorithm for the fractional version of the problem and proved that their algorithm is optimal in the class of the
task-independent (even not monotone) allocation algorithms.
Nisan and Ronen [14] also introduced mechanisms with verification and gave a polynomial-time (1+ ε)-approximation
truthfulmechanism for any fixed number of unrelatedmachineswhose execution times are bounded by some constant. This
result also holds for any (non-constant) number of related machines [4]. Truthful mechanisms with verification for related
machines have been characterized in [4].
1.3. Our contribution
A central question in (algorithmic) mechanism design is how to translate approximation/online algorithms into
approximation/online mechanisms. A general approach to the design of approximation/competitive mechanisms might
be that of developing general ‘‘monotonization’’ techniques: starting from any ρ-approximation/ competitive algorithm A,
transform A into a monotone algorithm Awith approximation/competitive ratio ρ depending on ρ. The following question
is of interest: given an algorithm A of approximation/competitive ratio ρ, can we obtain a monotone algorithm A with the
same approximation/competitive ratio? In this paper, we try to give answers to this question using the Q||Cmax problem as
case of study.
We first consider online mechanisms for Q2||Cmax. We show that any online ρ-competitive algorithm A can be turned
into a ρ-competitive online monotone algorithm A such that ρ ≤ max{ρ · t, 1 + 1/t}, for every t ≥ 1. Actually, we
prove a stronger result since algorithm A needs to be ρ-competitive only for the case of identical speeds (Theorem 4). In
particular, the ‘‘monotonization’’ of the greedy algorithm1 yields an online mechanism whose competitive ratio is at most
1+√7/2 < 1.823 (Corollary 1).
1 This algorithm, also known in the literature as ListScheduling, assigns the current job Jk to the machine that minimizes the completion time of Jk .
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Concerning the issue of designing new onlinemonotone algorithms and/or adapting existing ones, we observe that there
is a common idea in the design of several approximation/online algorithms that is used also in the Vickrey auction (see
e.g. [14]): speed vectors s = (s1, s2) and sα = (αs2, αs1) lead to the same solution (modulo a machine re-indexing).
We show that this (apparently natural) way of proceeding must necessarily lead to online monotone algorithms whose
competitive ratio is not smaller than 2. A similar negative result applies to all algorithms which assign the first job to the
fastest machine. These results show that, if one wants to obtain non-trivial upper bounds for twomachines, then one has to
design ‘‘unnatural’’ algorithms.
We also consider the case of an arbitrary number of machines. First of all, observe that all our lower bounds given for the
casem = 2 also apply to Qm||Cmax, for anym > 2. As for the upper bounds, in Section 5 we present a 12-competitive online
mechanismwith verification for any number of machines. This is the first constant-competitive truthful deterministic online
algorithm for a non-constant number of machines, albeit with verification.
Notation. Throughout the paper si will denote the speed of the ith machine, ti is its type (i.e., ti = 1/si) and bi is the type
reported by agent i to the mechanism. We denote by cost(X, (s, J)) the cost of the schedule X of the jobs in J with respect to
the speed vector s and we denote by opt(s, J) the cost of an optimal schedule of jobs in J with respect to the speed vector s.
All definitions of game theoretic concepts in the rest of the paper are to be intended for the Q||Cmax problem.
2. Characterization of online truthful mechanisms
For the offline case, Archer and Tardos [2] characterized the class of algorithms that can be used as part of a truthful
mechanism. More precisely, we have the following definition and theorem.
Definition 2 (Monotone Algorithm). An algorithm A is monotone if, for every i, for every J , for every b−i, for every bi and
b′i > bi it holds that
wAi ((b
′
i, b−i), J) ≤ wAi ((bi, b−i), J),
wherewAi ((bi, b−i), J) is the work assigned to machine iwhen J is the job sequence and agents report types (bi, b−i).
Theorem 1 (Offline Characterization [2]). A mechanism M = (A, P) is truthful if and only if A is monotone. Moreover, for every
monotone algorithm A, there exist payment functions P such that (A, P) is truthful and satisfies voluntary participation if and only
if
∫∞
0 w
A
i ((u, b−i), J) du <∞ for all i, J, and b−i. In this case, we can take the payments to be
Pi((bi, b−i), J) = bi · wAi ((bi, b−i), J)+
∫ ∞
bi
wAi ((u, b−i), J)du. (1)
Next, we translate the above result into the online setting. We will use this characterization to obtain our upper and
lower bounds.
Theorem 2 (Online Characterization). An online mechanism M = (A, P) is truthful if and only if A is an online monotone
algorithm.Moreover, for every onlinemonotone algorithmA, there exist payment functions P such that (A, P) is truthful.Moreover,
there exist payment functions Pki such that P
k
i ((bi, b−i), Jk) ≥ 0 for all J , k and (bi, b−i).
Proof. We only prove the last part of the theorem. The remaining part of the proof can be obtained from proof of Theorem 1
in [2].
Define Pk+1i ((bi, b−i), Jk+1) as
Pk+1i ((bi, b−i), J
k+1) def= Pi((bi, b−i), Jk+1)− Pi((bi, b−i), Jk).
Observe that, since we do not allow us to reassign jobs, it holds that, for every bi,
wAi ((bi, b−i), J
k) ≤ wAi ((bi, b−i), Jk+1).
Thus, by Eq. (1) we have that
Pk+1i ((bi, b−i), J
k+1) = bi · wAi ((bi, b−i), Jk+1)− bi · wAi ((bi, b−i), Jk) ≥ 0. 
3. Online monotonization
In this section, we give a general technique for transforming an online algorithm for Q2||Cmax into an online monotone
algorithm for Q2||Cmax. Based on this transformation, we present an online truthful mechanism whose competitive ratio is
about 1.823.
Let A be an online algorithm for the Q2||Cmax problem. The basic idea to obtain a monotone online algorithm from A
is to distinguish two cases: if a machine is significantly faster than the other we assign all jobs to that machine; if, instead,
machine speeds are ‘‘almost the same’’,we run algorithmA to produce a fixed schedule that does dependonly on themachine
indexes and not on their speeds. The algorithm template in Fig. 1 implements this idea.
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Fig. 1. An online monotone algorithm for two machines.
Fig. 2. The curve of the workwt-A-mon1 ((s1, s2), J) assigned by algorithm t-A-mon to machine 1.
Theorem 3. For every t > 1 and for every online algorithm A for Q2||Cmax, algorithm t-A-mon is an onlinemonotone algorithm
for Q2||Cmax.
Proof. Observe that when algorithm t-A-mon starts, depending on the machine speeds and on the parameter t it selects
to process all the jobs either with the online algorithm A or with the online algorithm that assigns all jobs to the fastest
machine. Thus t-A-mon is an online algorithm too.
Letwt-A-moni ((s1, s2), J) denote thework assigned tomachine i by t-A-mon on input J and (s1, s2). Also letW (J) =
∑|J|
a=1 Ja
be the sum of all jobs’ sizes. Observe that, by definition of t-A-mon, we have that
wt-A-mon1 ((s1, s2), J) =

wA1((1, 1), J) if s1 ≤ s2 and s1 ≥ s2/t ,
wA1((1, 1), J) if s1 > s2 and s1 ≤ s2 · t ,
0 if s1 ≤ s2 and s1 < s2/t ,
W (J) if s1 ≥ s2 and s1 > s2 · t .
(2)
Notice that, since t > 1, we have s2/t < s2. From the above equation we obtain the curve in Fig. 2 that gives the work
allocated to machine 1 by the algorithm. The figure clearly implies the monotonicity w.r.t. machine 1. The very same
argument shows the monotonicity w.r.t. machine 2. Hence the theorem follows. 
Theorem 4. Let A be an online algorithm for Q2||Cmax which is ρ-competitive for the special case where machines have identical
speeds. Then, for every t > 1, the resulting online algorithm t-A-mon isρ-competitive forQ2||Cmax, whereρ = max{ρ·t, 1+1/t}.
Proof. Assume that the speeds of the two machines are s1 = 1 and s2 = r ≥ 1. We first observe that assigning all jobs
to the fastest machine yields a solution of cost at most 1 + 1/r times the cost of an optimal solution. Therefore, if r > t ,
algorithm t-A-mon is (1+ 1/t)-competitive. If r ≤ t , instead, algorithm t-A-mon runs algorithm A and computes a solution
XA whose makespan is at most ρ times the cost of an optimal scheduling of the same set of jobs J on two machines with
identical speeds, that is cost(XA, ((1, r), J)) ≤ ρ ·opt((1, 1), J).We next show that cost(XA, ((1, r), J)) ≤ ρ · r ·opt((1, r), J).
First observe that for any scheduling X we have that
cost(X, ((1, 1), J)) ≥ cost(X, ((1, r), J)) ≥ cost(X, ((1, 1), J))
r
.
Moreover, if X∗ denotes an optimal solution for the instance ((1, s), J), then we have that
opt((1, s), J) ≥ cost(X
∗, ((1, 1), J))
s
≥ opt((1, 1), J)
s
.
From the above inequality and using the fact that the algorithm A is ρ-competitive, we obtain
cost(XA, ((1, r), J)) ≤ cost(XA, ((1, 1), J))
≤ ρ · opt((1, 1), J)
≤ ρ · r · opt((1, r), J). (3)
Suppose now that machine speeds are s1 and s2 ≥ s1. Using a simple rescaling argument, we have that
cost(XA, ((s1, s2), J)) = cost(XA, ((1, s2/s1), J))s1
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and
opt((s1, s2), J) = opt((1, s2/s1), J)s1 .
Then, using Eq. (3), we have that algorithmA-mon is (ρ · r)-competitive. Since we are in the case r ≤ t , the theorem
follows. 
Corollary 1. There exists an online truthful mechanism for the Q2||Cmax problem whose competitive ratio is 1+
√
7
2 ' 1.823.
Proof. The greedy algorithm is 3/2-competitive for the special case of Q2||Cmax where machines have identical speeds [10].
From Theorem4, using the greedy algorithm in the algorithm t-A-monwe obtain amonotone algorithmwhose competitive-
ratio is at most max{3t/2, 1+ 1/t}, where t > 1 can be chosen arbitrarily. In particular, for t = 1+
√
7
3 , the competitive ratio
is equal to 1+
√
7
2 ' 1.823. 
4. On building online monotone algorithms
In this section we show that a large class of ‘‘natural’’ monotone algorithms, including most of the known algorithms for
scheduling, cannot achieve a competitive ratio smaller than 2. This lower bound implies that, for m = 2, these algorithms
cannot improve over the trivial 2-approximation monotone algorithm that assigns all the jobs to the machine that declares
to be faster.
Apparently, a good way to obtain online monotone algorithms is to guarantee that faster machines receive more work.
In particular, when dealing with the case of only one job, a natural (optimal) solution is to assign it to the fastest machine.
This is also what a direct use of the so-called Vickery auction [15] would give for our problem. (These so-called ‘‘sealed bid’’
auctions compute a solution only based on the agents’ bids — see e.g. [14,2].) This motivates the following definition:
Definition 3 (Best-first Algorithm). A scheduling algorithm A is best-first if it always assigns the first job to the fastest
machine.
In addition, for each s1 and s2 ≥ s1, it is natural to treat speed vectors s′ = (s1, s2) and s′′ = (αs2, αs1) as essentially
the same instance: by rescaling, and reindexing machines we can reduce both of them to the instance (1, s2/s1). Hence,
an algorithm is supposed to produce the same solution for all the three instances. We thus consider the following class of
algorithms:
Definition 4 (Symmetric Algorithm). A scheduling algorithm A is symmetric if, for any two speed vectors s′ and s′′ such that
there exists a permutation pi and s′′ = pi(s′) it holds that, for all i,wAi (s′, J) = wApi(i)(s′′, J).
We prove now that each algorithm which is either best-first or symmetric cannot be less than 2-competitive.
Theorem 5. No online monotone best-first algorithm can be better than 2-competitive. This holds even for the case of two jobs
and two machines.
Proof. By contradiction, let A be a best-first, monotone and (2 − γ )-competitive algorithm, for some γ > 0. Consider
instance (s, J), where J = (1, 1+ ε), for some ε > 0, and let s1 = 1, s2 = 1+ ε, and si = ε for 3 ≤ i ≤ m. Notice that, since
A is (2 − γ )-competitive and best-first, it is possible to take ε sufficiently small so that A assigns the first job to machine 2
and the second job to machine 1.
Consider now a new instance (s′, J), where s′ is equal to s except for s′2 = 1 − ε. We observe that for this instance
algorithm A assigns no jobs to machine 2. In fact, since it is best-first, it assigns the first job to machine 1. Moreover, since
it is monotone, it has to assign a work to machine 2 not greater than 1. Thus, also the second job is assigned to machine 1.
However, this implies that cost(A(s′, J) = 2+ ε, while the optimum has cost 1+ ε. For ε sufficiently small, this contradicts
the hypothesis that A is (2− γ )-competitive. 
Theorem 6. No online monotone symmetric algorithm can be better than 2-competitive. This holds even for the case of two jobs
and two machines.
Proof. We prove the theorem form = 2. The extension tom > 2 is straightforward. Let us assume by contradiction that A
is a monotone, symmetric, and (2− γ )-competitive algorithm, for some γ > 0. Consider the three instances ((1, 1+ ε), J),
((1 + ε, 1), J) and ((1, 1), J), where J = (1, 1 + ε), for some ε > 0. It can be easily seen that for ε sufficiently small
(ε < γ2−γ ) with respect to all the three instances algorithm A cannot allocate both the jobs to the same machine, otherwise
it contradicts the hypothesis that it is 2− γ -competitive.
Thus, for each instance algorithm A can output one of two possible solutions:
solution machine 1 machine 2
SOL1 1+ ε 1
SOL2 1 1+ ε
Consider now the solutions produced on input the instance ((1, 1+ ε), J). We distinguish two cases:
– A((1, 1+ ε), J) = SOL1
Since A is symmetric, from Definition 4 it holds that
wA1((1+ ε, 1), J) = wA2((1, 1+ ε), J) = 1. (4)
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Observe that wA2((1, 1), J) = 1: indeed, since A is monotone, we have that wA2((1, 1), J) ≤ wA2((1, 1 + ε), J) = 1;
since A is (2− γ )-competitive,wA2((1, 1), J) > 0. Thus, algorithm A on input ((1, 1), J)must give in output the solution
SOL1.
Moreover, by the monotonicity of A, it must also hold that wA1((1 + ε, 1), J) ≥ wA1((1, 1), J) = 1 + ε. contradicting
Eq. (4).
– A((1, 1+ ε), J) = SOL2
Observe that algorithm A assigns the job J1 to machine 1 and, since reassignment of jobs is not allowed, it will assign
this job to the same machine even if we consider the sequence of jobs J1 = (J1). By the monotonicity of algorithm A we
have that wA2((1, 1), J1) ≤ wA2((1, 1 + ε), J1) = 0 which implies that wA1((1, 1), J1) = 1. Again, by the monotonicity of
algorithm A,wA1((1+ ε, 1), J1) = 1.
Consider now the assignment of the job J2 with respect to the speed vector (1 + ε, 1). This job cannot be assigned
to machine 1, otherwise the solution returned by A would have cost equal to 2 + ε and the competitive ratio would
be 2+ε1+ε > 2 − γ , contradicting the hypothesis that A is (2 − γ )-competitive. Therefore, it must be the case that
wA1((1+ ε, 1), J) = 1 andwA2((1+ ε, 1), J) = J2 = 1+ ε, contradicting the hypothesis that A is symmetric. 
5. Online mechanisms with verification
In this section we consider online mechanisms with verification [14,4]. In these mechanisms the payment to an agent
can be provided after the corresponding machine terminates; in this case, the mechanism can compute the payment as a
function of such finish time(s). In the online setting, once machine j releases a job Ji, the mechanism observing its release
time r(Ji) can compute the time taken by the machine to process the job and compare it with the type reported by the agent
at the beginning of the processing: if the agent declared to be faster than it really is (bj < sj), the mechanism recognizes
it lied and assigns no payment to the agent. However, agent j could still declare to be slower (i.e., bj > sj), release all jobs
accordingly (i.e., r(Ji) = Ji/bj) and be not caught by the mechanism.
In [4] we show that truthful mechanisms with verification allow us to use algorithms which satisfy a weaker form of
monotonicity:
Definition 5 (Roughly Monotone Algorithm [4]2). An algorithm A is roughly monotone if, for every job sequence J , for every
i, for every s−i it holds that
wAi ((si, s−i), J) = 0⇒ ∀s′i < si, wAi ((s′i, s−i), J) = 0.
The following result has been proved for offline algorithms/mechanisms for Q||Cmax. Its extension to the online case is
straightforward and it uses the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2.
Theorem 7 (Essentially Due to [4]). If M = (A, P) is an online truthful mechanismwith verification then A is roughly monotone.
Moreover, for every roughly monotone, constant competitive algorithm A, there exists a payment function P such that (A, P) is an
online truthful mechanism with verification satisfying the voluntary participation.
5.1. Online mechanisms for arbitrary number of machines
In [3] an 8-competitive algorithm Assign-R has been given for the online Q||Cmax problem. Let s be the speed vector and
let J be the list of jobs already scheduled.
The algorithm receives an extra parameter Λ and for each new job assigns it to the least capable machine, that is, the
slowest machine such that the cost of the resulting assignment stays below 2Λ. The following lemma is a reformulation of
the result proved in [3].
Lemma 1 (Essentially Due to [3]). For every speed vector s and for every Λ ≥ opt(s, J), algorithm Assign-R does not fail in
assigning any newly arrived job in J. Moreover, if algorithm Assign-R fails in assigning a job Jk, then opt(s, J) ≥ opt(s, Jk) > Λ.
Then, if the optimum is known in advance we can run algorithm Assign-R with Λ = opt(s, J) and obtain a 2-competitive
assignment. Using a simple doubling technique (see e.g. [5]) one can obtain an algorithm Assign-R which, starting with
Λ = 1, doubles the value ofΛ each timeAssign-R(s,Λ) fails in assigning a job Ji. In this case a new instance ofAssign-Rwith
a new parameterΛ′ = 2Λ is run to assign job Jk and jobs that possibly arise after it. (We continue doubling the value ofΛ
until it is possible to assign Jk to somemachine.) Each instance of Assign-R computes a new assignment independently from
the assignments computed by the previous instances. This technique can increment the competitive ratio of the algorithm
by at most a factor of 4: a factor of 2 is due to the work assigned in all the previous phases except for the last; another factor
of 2 is due to the approximation ofΛ.
Theorem 8 (Due to [3]). Algorithm Assign-R is at most 8-competitive.
Observe that algorithm Assign-R is not roughly monotone. In fact, since jobs are assigned to least capable machines, a
machine can receive no jobs to process when it declares its real speed but it can receive some jobs when it declares to be
slower. To avoid this, we have to guarantee that if a machine j receives a positive work all machines faster than j receive
positive work too. In the following, we show how to modify algorithm Assign-R in order to obtain a roughly monotone
algorithm for Q||Cmax having a constant competitive ratio.
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Fig. 3. An online roughly monotone algorithm for any number of machines.
We partition jobs in two sets: the real jobs that are jobs assigned to machines using algorithm Assign-R, and the ghost
jobs that are assigned tomachines according to a different rule, to guarantee that the roughlymonotonicity condition holds.
For each machine j letw′j andw
′′
j be the sums of weights of ghost and real jobs assigned to this machine, respectively.
Algorithm Monotone-Assign-R (see Fig. 3) receives a threshold Λ. In assigning a new job, the algorithm considers the
slowest machine i for which the makespan of the resulting schedule, computed considering only the real jobs, does not
exceed 2Λ (step 2). Then, two cases can occur:
1. if there exists a machine faster than j that has received no work yet, job Jk is assigned to the fastest of such machines and
it is considered as a ghost job, that is it will not be considered by algorithm Assign-R (step 5);
2. if all machines faster than j have been assigned at least one job, then job Jk is assigned to machine j and it is considered
as a real job (step 6).
Lemma 2. For every speed vector s and for every Λ ≥ opt(s, J), algorithm Monotone-Assign-R does not fail in assigning any
newly arrived job in J. Moreover, if algorithmMonotone-Assign-R fails in assigning a job Jk, then opt(s, J) ≥ opt(s, Jk) > Λ.
Proof. Let J ′ denote the set of ghost jobs, and J ′′ def= J \ J ′ be the set of real jobs. We remark that the partition in ghost and
real jobs depends on the algorithm. Notice that algorithm Monotone-Assign-R can fail only in step 2, if it cannot find any
machine that can schedule next job in time not greater than 2Λ. Observe that in this step the algorithm considers only the
work due to real jobs already assigned to machines. Thus, we can restrict our analysis only to real jobs.
Real jobs are assigned according to algorithm Assign-R, without considering ghost jobs. Hence, by Lemma 1, if Λ ≥
opt(s, J) ≥ opt(s, J ′′) we have that algorithm Assign-R never fails in allocating jobs in J ′′, and this implies that algorithm
Monotone-Assign-R never fails in allocating jobs in J .
If, instead, Monotone-Assign-R fails in allocating a job Jk, then Assign-R fails as well in allocating all real jobs in Jk.
Therefore, by Lemma 1 opt(s, Jk) ≥ Λ. Since opt(s, J) ≥ opt(s, Jk) the lemma follows. 
Using a doubling technique as in [5] one can obtain an algorithmMonotone-Assign-Rwhich, starting fromΛ = 1, doubles
the value ofΛ each timeMonotone-Assign-R(s,Λ) fails: in this case we assign Ji, and jobs that possibly arise subsequently,
by runningMonotone-Assign-Rwith a new parameterΛ′ = 2Λ. We continue doubling the value ofΛ until it is possible to
assign Ji to somemachine. Notice that the assignmentmade for a particular value ofΛ, is independent from the assignments
computed for smaller values ofΛ.
Theorem 9. AlgorithmMonotone-Assign-R is at most 12-competitive.
Proof. Let J ′ denote the set of ghost jobs, and J ′′ = J \ J ′ be the set of real jobs. Moreover, let Λ(s, J) denote the last value
for whichMonotone-Assign-R does not fail. By Lemma 1 we have thatΛ(s, J) ≤ 2opt(s, J).
Observe that algorithmMonotone-Assign-R assigns real jobs in J ′′ according to the algorithmAssign-R and, by Theorem 8
we have that for each j the time necessary to process all the real jobs assigned to machine j is
w′′j /sj ≤ 8opt(s, J ′′) ≤ 8opt(s, J).
Moreover, the algorithmMonotone-Assign-R assigns at most one ghost job to machine j, having weightw′j . Notice that this
job is assigned tomachine jwhile using the boundΛ′ ≤ Λ(s, J) if there exists at least amachine slower than j that can finish
to process this job, and all the jobs previously assigned to it, in at most 2Λ′. Thus, we have that
w′j/sj ≤ 2Λ′ ≤ 2Λ(s, J) ≤ 4opt(s, J).
Let X be the cost of the solution computed byMonotone-Assign-R(s, J). We can state that
cost(X, (s, J)) ≤ max
1≤j≤m
{
w′j + w′′j
sj
}
≤ 12 · opt(s, J)
and the Theorem follows. 
Theorem 10. AlgorithmMonotone-Assign-R is roughly monotone.
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Proof. Consider two instances (s, J) and (s′, J) such that J = J1, J2, . . . is a sequence of jobs and s = (sj, s−j) and s = (s′j, s−j)
are speed vectors with s′j < sj. With a little abuse of notation we denote by wj(s, J) the work assigned by algorithm
Monotone-Assign-R to machine j on input the instance (s, J) and by Λ(s, k) the value of Λ for which Monotone-Assign-R
allocates job Jk with respect to the speed vector s. To prove the Theorem we have to show that for each job sequence J , if
wj(s, J) = 0 then wj(s′, J) = 0. As a matter of fact, we will prove a stronger result. In fact, we will prove by induction on k
thatΛ(s, k) = Λ(s′, k) and thatMonotone-Assign-R produces the same allocation for the two instances.
The base step k = 1 is trivial. Let l 6= j be the machine that receive job J1 with respect to s. This means that there exists
no machine (in particular j) that can process this job in timeΛ(s, 0) and l is the fastest machine that can process it in time
not greater than 2Λ(s, 0). Obviously, both these two properties are still true if we reduce speed of machine j from s to s′.
Suppose now by inductive hypothesis that Λ(s, k − 1) = Λ(s′, k − 1) and the allocations of the jobs in Jk−1 computed
with respect to s and s′ are equal. Let l 6= j be the machine that receive job Jk with respect to s. We distinguish two cases. If
Λ(s, k) = Λ(s, k− 1) then either j cannot process job Jk in time 2Λ(s, k) or it can but l is faster than j and it has no work. In
both the cases the same allocation will be chosen even if we reduce the speed of machine j. IfΛ(s, k) > Λ(s, k−1), instead,
we have that no machine is able to process job Jk in time Λ(s, k), and thus Jk/sj > Λ(s, k), but there exists a machine l,
distinct from j, that is able to process the job within time 2Λ(s, k). Obviously, this is still true if we reduce speed of machine
j. ThusΛ(s, k) = Λ(s′, k). Moreover, the algorithmdoes not assign the job Jk tomachine j since either it is too slow to process
it or there exists a machine faster than j that can process it and it received no job in previous steps. In both the cases the
algorithm will compute the same assignment if we reduce the speed of machine j. This concludes the proof. 
By combining the previous theorems with Theorem 7 we obtain the following:
Corollary 2. There exists an online truthful mechanism with verification which is 12-competitive for any number of machines.
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